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Abstract 
 
We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of 
corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. 
Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing 
the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous 
institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can 
capture a proportion of public spending. The "concentration of political power" is the extent to 
which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction 
is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium 
corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In 
particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is 
concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are 
determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for 
legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions 
respectively are limited. 
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Introduction
The concern of international organizations for fighting corruption is supported by a
large volume of empirical research measuring its devastating effect on economic perfor-
mance and growth. These studies were made possible by the increasing number and
quality of measures of corruption (see the indicators of the World Bank and the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide, and the corruption perceptions index from Transparency
International, to mention aggregate measures only).
The way corruption is modeled in theory is however not yet firmly established. Two
different strategies have been followed in the literature. Most of the theory of cor-
ruption has been developed in a static context and focuses on incentives, information
and enforcement determining corrupt practices, mainly due to market failures (Shleifer
and Vishny 1993, Banerjee 1997, Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). A key element in this
literature is that individuals face a choice between different activities, including pro-
ductive and rent-seeking activities. A minor strand of the literature is devoted to the
dynamics and growth aspects of corruption activities, using dynamic general equilib-
rium modeling. But in these studies, corruption is either exogenous, or a by-product of
another activity, and households are not subject to incentive constraints. For example
in Le Van and Maurel (2006), corruption is identical to an (exogenous) productivity
parameter, whose consequences for catching-up and convergence are analyzed. Ehrlich
and Lui (1999) build a growth model with thresholds in human capital, generating two
equilibria, one with corruption and one without. Corruption is a direct product of gov-
ernment size, which is set arbitrarily. Another endogenous growth model is proposed
by Mohtadi and Roe (2003). In this model, the equilibrium size of the rent-seeking
sector depends on the “state of democracy” which is related to the flow of information
and access to the government. Eicher, Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa, and van Ypersele (2006) pos-
tulate two exogenous types of politicians: honest and dishonest ones. The dishonest
ones can nevertheless imitate the honest ones if certain incentives are available.1
In this paper, we explicitly introduce an incentive constraint into a dynamic optimiza-
tion program. In doing so we bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and
the mostly static theory of corruption. This way of setting the problem has important
consequences both in theory and for empirical analysis. A key implication is to distin-
guish the prevailing level of corruption, which is an endogenous variable determined
1Further references are Long and Sorger (2006) where corruption is possible because its revenues
can be held abroad, and Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) who propose in their appendix (p294-299)
one of the first dynamic model with corruption (“wealth redistribution”) but in which its level is
simply exogenous.
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at equilibrium, from its institutional factors. Here we concentrate on two institutional
parameters. We use the term “technology of corruption” to denote the ease with which
rent-seekers can capture part of public spending; it depends on the legal framework
and its implementation. The “concentration of political power” is defined as the extent
to which rent-seekers have more political influence than other people.
One prediction of our theory is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on
income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints
that hold at equilibrium. In other words, the model displays several regimes with
different properties. The combination of failing legal and political institutions should
have more detrimental effects on income growth.
At the empirical level it seems necessary to estimate a system of equations where
both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously by the quality of
institutions and other exogenous factors. In particular, we will show that income
growth is more affected by our proxies for legal institutions in a context of failing
political institutions and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the structure of the model. The
resolution of the dynamic problem is proposed in Section 2, with a characterization
of the different regimes. In Section 3, we report empirical estimations of the main
implications of the model, including the description of data, instruments, and tests.
Section 5 presents our conclusion.
1 Technology, Preferences, and Voting Equilibrium
The model is set up in discrete time. The economy is populated by a mass of identical
households of measure Nt growing at rate n. Households choose between working
either in the productive sector or in the rent-seeking activity (in this paper we treat
rent-seeking and corruption as synonymous). We denote by 1 − xt the proportion of
the population in the productive sector, and by xt the proportion in the rent-seeking
sector. The model can also be interpreted as if each household was allocating its time
optimally between the two activities.
Technology
Public capital Kt is the only stock of capital in this economy. Investment spending
is denoted It. Corruption acts as a tax on investment It. Rent-seekers are able to
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extract some of the public investment It, which is proportional to their fraction of
population. Only a fraction 1−νxt of investment spending is effectively invested while
νxtIt accrues as income for rent-seekers. The parameter ν ≥ 0 reflects the corruption
technology of the economy. It is positively related to the ease with which rent-seekers
can divert resources. The value 1/ν should be interpreted as the proportion of rent-
seekers “needed” to divert 100% of investment. The law of motion of capital is:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + (1− νxt)It
with parameter δ being the depreciation rate (δ ∈ (0, 1)). Denoting the per-capita
variables as kt = Kt/Nt and it = It/Nt, the law of motion of capital can be rewritten
as:
(1 + n)kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + (1− νxt)it (1)
There is one physical good which is used for consumption and investment. Total
production Qt depends positively on labor input Nt(1−xt) and on services from capital.
The production function is written as the product of two terms:
Qt = b[Nt(1− xt)]f [Kt].
The function b[.] is increasing and concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions limL→0 b
′[L]
= +∞ and limL→+∞ b′[L] = 0. The production function f [.] is increasing and concave.
As in Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990), public capital enters the production
function directly. We assume that the product b[Nt(1 − xt)]f [Kt] is homogeneous of
degree one with respect to labor input Nt(1 − xt) and capital input Kt which allows
the output per person qt = Qt/Nt to be written as:
qt = b[1− xt]f [kt].
Public investment spending is financed by a lump sum tax Tt paid by every citizen:
2
NtTt = It ⇒ Tt = it.
An alternative would be to tax only people in the productive sector which would
introduce an additional channel through which corruption could play a role, i.e. by
2Note that in the absence of consumption-leisure choice, lump-sum taxation is the same as con-
sumption taxation (e.g. Value Added Tax)
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reducing the fiscal base of the government. To keep the model as simple as possible we
abstract from other types of public spending and from public debt.
Preferences and Incentives
At each date, households consume their income. Income includes either the product of
corruption or the return from the productive activity. Their preferences are represented
by a CIES utility function u[.] with inter-temporal elasticity of substitution σ. The
utility of working in the productive sector Ut is equal to the utility of the income in this
sector. We assume that firms operating in this sector are owned by the workers, or, in
other words, everybody is self-employed. Workers are thus paid the average product
b[Nt(1− xt)]f [Kt]
Nt(1− xt) =
b[1− xt]
1− xt f [kt] = Γ[1− xt]f [kt]
with Γ[1− xt] = b[1 − xt]/(1− xt). They also pay taxes Tt. Net income per person is
thus
yt = Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− Tt = Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− it.
The utility in the productive sector is given by:
Ut = u[yt]. (2)
The utility in the rent-seeking sector Vt is the utility associated with the income from
corruption, net of taxes. Since total income from corruption is νxtit, the income per
person is νit, as long as xt ≤ 1/ν. If xt = 1/ν, all spending it is diverted by rent-
seekers, and there is no incentive for the marginal person to move into rent-seeking.
Then,
Vt = u [νit − it] if xt ≤ 1/ν,
Vt = 0 otherwise.
The individual utility from corruption Vt does not depend on the proportion of the
population which is corrupt for xt ≤ 1/ν but decreases to 0 as soon as xt is larger than
1/ν. The utility from the productive sector Ut is a positive function of xt. Indeed,
because of marginal decreasing returns to labor, the function Γ[1− xt] is decreasing in
1− xt. It decreases from +∞ when 1− xt = 0 to Γ[1]. Three cases may arise.
In the first case, the return in the rent-seeking sector is always dominated by that in
the productive sector even when the whole workforce is in the productive sector. In
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this case, we have
x∗t = 0
and
νit < Γ[1]f [kt]. (3)
In such a situation, corruption does not exist at all. Condition 3 can be understood as
a condition on the parameter ν relative to the function b[.]. If ν is large enough, i.e. if
the corruption technology is efficient enough, this corner situation will never prevail.
In the second case, there is a value x⋆t ∈ (0, 1) for which the utility from the two
activities is equal at equilibrium. If corruption at equilibrium satisfies xt ∈ (0, 1/ν),
then the following constraint holds:
Ut = Vt ⇒ Γ[1− xt]f [kt] = νit. (4)
Condition (4) states that, at equilibrium, there is a relationship between the share of
the population in the rent-seeking sector (xt) and public capital (kt), the effectiveness
of corruption technology (ν), and the amount of public spending subject to corrup-
tion (it). This relation, which describes the choice of activity by households, will act
as a constraint for the political economy problem and makes the level of corruption
endogenous. We label it the incentive constraint.
In the third case, the income possibilities from rent-seeking are exhausted: x∗t = 1/ν.
In this case we have
νit = Γ[1− 1/ν]f [kt]. (5)
In this case, investment i is entirely diverted, implying that the stock of capital k
shrinks. Finally, there is a fourth possibility with νit > Γ[1− 1/ν]f [kt]; this would be
a situation where rent-seeking was more profitable than productive activity, but where
the corruption possibilities were completely exhausted, so that those who worked in
the productive sector had a lower income which was still better than the zero income
they would have got if they had chosen rent-seeking for themselves.
If the situation described in the latter two cases persists, income in the productive
sector tends to zero, which cannot be an optimal solution. Hence these regimes can
only appear temporarily. In the following sections we will assume that xt < 1/ν at
equilibrium, i.e. we will rule out the possibility of maximum corruption because it is
unrealistic and cannot be a long-run equilibrium.
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Political Economy Equilibrium
The levels of public investment it and taxes Tt are chosen through probabilistic voting.
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According to Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), the maximization program of each party
implements the maximum of the following weighted social welfare function:4
max
∞∑
t=0
ρt ((1− xt)Ut + (1 + θ)xtVt) subject to (1), (6), and K0 given,
with νit ≤ Γ[1− xt]f [kt]. (6)
The parameter θ is the additional weight attached to the people in the rent-seeking
sector. From probabilistic theory, it captures the responsiveness of voters to the change
in utility. In particular, a group that has little ideological bias cares relatively more
about economic policy. Such groups are therefore targeted by politicians and enjoy
high political power. An alternative view is that households can gain political power
by purchasing votes (see, for example, Docquier and Tarbalouti 2001). If θ = 0 the
problem can be interpreted as that of a benevolent social planner giving equal weight
to all citizens; if θ = ∞, the social planner is the kleptocratic government envisioned
by Kanczuk (1998), maximizing the discounted flow of income from corruption.
2 Solution Characteristics
To solve the voting problem we can write the following infinite Lagrangian:
∞∑
t=0
ρt {((1− xt)Ut + (1 + θ)xtVt) + ρµt+1 [(1− δ)kt + (1− νxt)it − (1 + n)kt+1]
+φt [Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− νit] + ωtxt} .
3Assume that there are two political parties, a and b. Each one proposes a policy. Instead of
assuming that an individual votes for party a with probability one every time party a’s policy gives
him/her higher utility (as in the median voter model), probabilistic voting theory supposes that this
vote is uncertain. More precisely, the probability that a person votes for party a is a smooth function
of the utility gain associated with the implementation of policy a. This function captures the idea
that voters care about an “ideology” variable in addition to the specific policy measure at hand. The
presence of a concern for ideology, which is independent of the policy measure, makes the political
choice less predictable (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for different formalizations of this approach).
The probability that a given voter will vote for party a increases gradually as the party’s platform
becomes more attractive. Party a maximizes its expected vote share. Party b acts symmetrically, and,
at equilibrium, the two proposed policies coincide.
4Notice that this maximization problem can alternatively be interpreted in the light of the lobbying
literature (see Bernheim and Whinston 1986).
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The variable µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint (1).
The variables φt and ωt are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the constraints:
νit ≤Γ[1− xt]f [kt]
0 ≤ xt.
The multiplier φt associated with the incentive constraint is the shadow price of cor-
ruption, reflecting the idea that the outcome of the vote has an effect on the type of
activity chosen by households. For example, if voters decide to increase the amount of
public investment, more households will work in the rent-seeking sector.
At each date, three cases are possible, depending on which constraint holds. The
optimality conditions are derived in Appendix A for the three possible regimes. From
these conditions we can analyze how the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule is modified by
the presence of corruption. In the next section we consider the different regimes in
turn.
Note that these cases stand for three regimes at a same equilibrium, and not for three
different equilibria. They correspond to different values of the parameters at the same
equilibrium. Multiple equilibria usually arise in decentralized economies when the level
of corrupt activity influences its own rate of return (Bardhan 2006), for example, when
a high level of rent-seeking entails that it is an individual’s interest to be a rent-seeker
as well.
2.1 Benchmark Regime
We start with the regime where Equation (3) holds, so that the incentive constraint
is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment is not distorted. We
label this case without corruption the benchmark regime because it can be seen as
a benchmark against which we can evaluate the cases with corruption. From the first-
order conditions analyzed in Appendix A we derive the following “Keynes-Ramsey”
rule:
u′[yt]
u′[yt+1]
=
(
yt+1
yt
) 1
σ
=
ρ(1− δ + Γ[1] f ′K [kt+1])
1 + n
(7)
i.e. the higher the net marginal product of capital 1 − δ + Γ[1] f ′K [kt+1], the more it
pays to depress the current level of income to enjoy higher income in the future.
The benchmark case arises if condition (3) holds. This condition can be interpreted
as an upper bound on the corruption technology ν. There is another condition for
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this regime to prevail, which is derived in the appendix from the positivity of the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ωt associated with xt ≥ 0. This condition is written:
1 + θ <
u[yt] + u
′[yt] (νit + Γ
′[1]f [kt])
u[νit − it] . (8)
It requires θ not to be too large. For a given corruption technology ν, if θ is large,
rent-seekers have much more political weight than productive workers, and it is less
likely that the equilibrium without corruption could prevail.
Balanced growth path
In the long-run, variables Kt, It and Yt all grow at the same rate n. All the per
capita variables converge to a constant level. The following proposition establishes
the essential properties of the equilibrium without corruption and the conditions for
reaching it.
Proposition 1 Let the Modified Golden Rule stock of capital kρ be given by:
1− δ + Γ[1]f ′K [kρ] =
1 + n
ρ
. (9)
If there exists a balanced growth path solution to the voting problem which satisfies
ν <
Γ[1]f [kρ]
(n+ δ)kρ
(10)
and
1 + θ <
u[yρ] + u
′[yρ] (ν(n + δ)kρ + Γ
′[1]f [kρ])
u[(ν − 1)(n+ δ)kρ] , (11)
with yρ = Γ[1]f [kρ]−(n+δ)kρ, then there is no corruption, i.e. x = 0, and the long-run
k = kρ.
Equation (9) is a Modified Golden Rule. The marginal productivity of capital is equal
to the growth factor of the population divided by the discount factor ρ. Conditions
(10) and (11) show that such a regime with no distortion will prevail if the corruption
technology is not too efficient, and if the political weight of rent-seekers is not too high.
In the next section, we explore, through a numerical example, the zone in the space
{ν, θ} for which this regime holds.
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2.2 Distortion without Corruption
In this regime, the incentive constraint holds with equality at xt = 0. Intuitively,
the government will have to lower investment it in order to deter households from
rent-seeking. There is less capital k in the economy as a consequence of the drop in
investment i necessary to deter corruption. Corruption acts like a negative externality
which can be limited at a certain cost. In Appendix A we compute a modified Keynes-
Ramsey rule:
u′[yt−1]
u′[yt]
=
ρ (Γ[1]f ′K [kt] + 1− δ)
1 + n
+
ρ (Γ[1]f ′K [kt] + 1− δ)
1 + n
φt
u′[yt]
− ν φt−1
u′[yt]
.
Compared to Equation (7), the last two terms on the right hand side are new and reflect
the distortionary effect of potential corruption on investment. The interpretation is
easier when we look at the rule at steady state, which leads to a modified “Modified
Golden Rule” that incorporates corruption:
1− δ + Γ[1]f ′K [k] =
1 + n
ρ
u′[y]
u′[y] + φ
+ ν
ρ
(1 + n)
φ
u′[y] + φ
.
Compared to the benchmark regime there are two modifications. The discounted
growth rate of the population is now multiplied by a factor smaller than one: u′[y]/(u′[y]+
φ). And the net marginal productivity of capital is equal to the sum of this smaller
growth rate of population with a positive term depending on the shadow price of cor-
ruption. Comparing this sum on the right hand side to the simpler term (1 + n)/ρ of
the benchmark model, we see that
1 + n
ρ
u′[y]
u′[y] + φ
+ ν
ρ
(1 + n)
φ
u′[y] + φ
>
1 + n
ρ
⇔ ν >
(
1 + n
ρ
)2
.
Hence, if ν is large enough, i.e. if potential corruption is sufficiently harmful, the
incentive constraint has a negative impact on investment in k, which allows corruption
to be kept out of the economy.
2.3 Interior Regime
In this case, Constraint (3). Two forces work in opposite directions: the interest of
having households working in the productive sector against the additional utility drawn
from the presence of rent-seekers.
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To better understand the role of the incentive constraint, we look at the optimal value
of the corresponding multiplier, φt, the shadow price of corruption. From the optimality
conditions of Appendix A, we obtain:
φt =
−θu[yt] + νρµt+1it − (1− xt)u′[yt]|Γ′[1− xt]|f [kt]
|Γ′[1− xt]|f [kt] > 0
The shadow price of corruption is the sum of three terms. The first term −θu[yt] is the
direct effect of xt on the objective function. For a correct interpretation of this term,
we need to assume that the utility function is positive which requires σ > 1 with the
CIES functional form. When corrupt people carry more weight (θ > 0), the cost of
the constraint is decreased. The second term νρµt+1it is positive and reflects the loss
of investment and future capital because of corruption. This second term weighs more
if the corruption technology (ν) is more efficient. The third term is negative: if there
is more corruption, fewer people work in the productive sector, but their individual
productivity is higher because of decreasing marginal returns to labor.
We computed the Modified Golden Rule in Appendix A. Unfortunately, the computa-
tions are very involved and do not allow clearcut results to be derived as was possible
for the other regimes.
2.4 Numerical Illustration
To illustrate Proposition 1 as well as the properties of the different long-run regimes,
we run a numerical example. We first give log-linear functional forms to our functions:
b[1 − x] = (1 − x)α, and f [k] = k1−α. The technology parameter is set at α = 3/4.
Considering that one model period is equivalent to one year, we assume population
growth at rate n = 0.005, a discount factor of 0.96, and depreciation rate δ = 0.04.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at σ = 2.
The benchmark regime arises when ν and θ are small enough. Conditions (10) and
(11) can be written explicitly as:
ν < 7.722
1 + θ <
1.165(0.166ν + 1.906)√
ν − 1 .
Table 1 gives three examples of steady states. Example A describes a benchmark
regime where ν and θ satisfy the system above. There is no corruption (x = 0), the
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shadow price of corruption is zero too (φ = 0), and the stock of capital is determined
by the Modified Golden Rule (9). In Example B, we assume the same low political
weight attached to rent-seekers (θ = 1/4) but increase the efficiency of the corruption
technology ν to ν = 9. The economy switches to a regime where corruption is still
absent, but its possibility imposes a distortion on public investment. This is reflected
by the fact that the shadow price of corruption is now positive and public investment
is reduced. The capital stock and output are slightly reduced, compared to the bench-
mark. Finally, Example C is a case of an interior regime, which arises for high values of
θ. In this case the rent-seekers have such a high political weight (θ = 3/2) that public
investment is encouraged. Households spend 19% of their time on corruption activities.
Notice that investment i is very high but a large fraction (νx = 4 × 0.19 = 0.76) is
diverted, implying that the stock of capital k is low. Looking at output in the three
examples, we observe that A and B are associated with relatively high y, while example
C describes a poorer economy.
ν θ φ x i k y
A 4 1/4 0 0 0.184 4.093 1.238
B 9 1/4 0.019 0 0.150 3.337 1.201
C 4 3/2 0.331 0.19 0.288 1.422 0.865
Table 1: Steady state comparisons
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Strategy
From the theoretical model presented above, we can see that the level of corruption and
income per capita depend on different parameters and that the relation between these
parameters and the two dependent variables is different according to which regime fits.
The benchmark regime and the regime with distortion but no corruption correspond
to countries with controlled corruption and a high growth rate, which have a low value
of θ and a low or a high value of ν respectively. The interior regime is more likely to
correspond to countries with high ν and θ, a low level of income growth and widespread
corruption.
Hence, the model leads us to predict that the effects of parameters ν and θ on growth
and equilibrium corruption should be weaker in countries with low θ and ν respectively.
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In what follows, we present the data used to measure first the two dependent variables
and then the parameters affecting them. We will introduce interaction terms between
the variables measuring ν and θ in order to test the key predictions highlighted above.
We present the empirical model and the estimation method before discussing the in-
strumental variables. Then, we present and interpret empirical results.
3.2 Data, Model and Method
The two indices used to approximate the level of corruption and the growth rate are
described below.
• Corrup: The extent of corruption is represented in the model by νx, the share of
spending which is diverted from its aim. As a proxy for νx, we use the “Control
of Corruption” index (CorrupWB) provided by the World Bank and presented
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). The variable we use results from
the following transformation: Corrup = 2.5 − CorrupWB. This index is an ag-
gregate of the results of several surveys. Some of them are based on questions
dealing with the ease of getting involved in corruption ν (e.g. “How well would
you say the current government is handling the fight against corruption in the
government?”) and some others with the level of corruption x (e.g. “How many
government officials do you think are involved in corruption?”). Hence, Corrup is
a measure of the interaction term νx. Contrary to Transparency International’s
corruption perceptions index, the World Bank one makes it possible to conduct
intertemporal, as well as cross-country, comparisons. However, measurement er-
rors demand that we proceed with great caution5. Although it confuses the extent
and the level of corruption, this index has the advantage of measuring mainly
public corruption and, within public corruption, mainly political corruption. We
use the World Bank’s measure of corruption based on perception surveys, al-
though it suffers measurement problems6. Other indices used to measure public
corruption (e.g. from Business International (Ehrlich and Lui 1999) or Political
Risk Services (Mauro 1997)) have the same disadvantages. But the World Bank
index reduces each source-specific bias by combining them.
5In the following subsection, we make explicit the method we use to deal with the endogeneity
implied by measurement errors.
6To our knowledge, quantitative indices of political public corruption, not based on perceptions do
not allow international comparisons since they are only available for Italy: Golden and Picci (2005)
approximate the level of corruption in a given region by calculating the difference between the amounts
of physical public capital and the amounts of investment cumulatively allocated for these public works.
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• Growth: This index measures the logarithm of constant PPP GDP per capita
growth on 10 years. It is obtained from data on the logarithm of constant PPP
GDP per capita provided by the WDI database. Using Growth as a dependent
variable and regressing it on a set of explanatory variables including lnY0 is
equivalent to regressing lnY on the same set of variables.
The set of parameters ν, θ, ρ, n and productivity Γ[.] are measured with the following
variables.
1. Techcor: The effect of ν is estimated by using the Rule of Law index available
in the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS). This index
is an aggregate of perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and pre-
dictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. To use the index
as a proxy for ν, we assume that the technology of corruption is as inefficient as
the legal (penal and judicial) system is. We operate the following transformation:
Techcor = 2.5− Rule of Law, so that the higher the variable Rule of Law, the
higher is the probability of a corrupt public agent being caught and punished,
and the weaker the technology of corruption (Techcor).
2. Polbias: As a proxy for θ, that is the political weight given to rent-seekers in
the objective function, we use an indicator of the lack of political rights taken
from Freedom House. Few political rights for the population indicate a strong
concentration of power in the hands of a very few. And those who hold the power
are presumably rent-seekers (because votes are purchased as mentioned above).
Hence, if political rights are weak, power is concentrated in the hands of rent-
seekers, which means θ is high. We subtract 1 from the original index in order to
obtain a variable ranging from 0 (if the country provides very extended political
rights to its citizens) to 7 (if the citizens have no political rights). Figure 5 in
Appendix B represents the countries in the plane {ν, θ}.
3. Patience: This variable indicates the number of years the party of the chief
executive has been in office, taken from Beck et al. (2001). It is used as a proxy
for the discount factor ρ. A “forward-looking” variable indicating in how many
years the next elections will take place would have fitted better with the discount
factor but, to the best of our knowledge, this is not available. Here we assume
that political groups can predict their term of office relatively well. Thus, if the
political group has been in power for a long time, which was expected, the group
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is more patient and values the future more than parties which expect to be in
power for a shorter period.
4. Pop: The rate of growth of the total population, taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI) database, gives us n.
5. Γ[.]: We use two dummy variables: Tropic which is equal to 1 if the country is
located between the tropic of Cancer and the tropic of Capricorn, 0 otherwise;
and Ldlock equal to 1 for landlocked countries, and to 0 otherwise. This enables
us to control for geographic conditions affecting productivity Γ[.].
We also introduce the logarithm of the 10 year-lagged constant PPP GDP per capita,
lnY0. This is provided by the WDI database. All these variables are imperfect mea-
sures of the parameters. This reinforces the risk of endogeneity biases, also due to
simultaneity and to the omission of variables. We present the instruments we use to
control for endogeneity below. Descriptive statistics for all the variables and the list of
countries used in the econometric analysis are provided in Appendix B (see Tables 3,
4 and 5).
In the benchmark regime, the endogenous variables are not affected by small variations
in ν and θ. As mentioned above, countries in such a situation also have more extended
political rights and rule of law respectively. To control for this eventuality, we add an
interaction term Techcor ∗ Polbias in the list of regressors.
We estimate a restricted form system of two equations where each endogenous variable
is a function of the measured parameters and initial conditions:


Corrupit = β1 + β2Techcorit + β3Polbiasit + β4Techcor ∗ Polbiasit
+ β5Patienceit + β6Popit + β7Tropicit + β8Ldlockit + β9 lnY0it + ρit
Growthit = γ1 + γ2Techcorit + γ3Polbiasit + γ4Techcor ∗ Polbiasit
+ γ5Patienceit + γ6Popit + γ7Tropicit + γ8Ldlockit + γ9 lnY0it + ςit
Estimates are run on even-year data7 for the period 1996 to 2004 on 62 countries using
a three-stage least squares (3sls) procedure. We first estimate an unrestricted model
(see Table 6 in Appendix B). At each step, we perform a Wald test that the least
significant parameter of each equation is null. If the p-value of a coefficient is above
7The index of corruption is only available from the World Bank for even years.
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0.15, we reject the coefficient at the following step. Hence, at the end of the procedure,
we retain a restricted model for which all the coefficients have a low p-value (below
0.15).
The three-stage least squares method has several advantages. First, it reduces simul-
taneity biases. If there is a correlation between the regressors and the error terms, 3sls
estimators are still consistent, unlike ordinary least squares estimators. Second, 3sls
provide estimators correcting not only for the residuals’ heteroskedasticity (residuals’
variance depends on the technology of corruption and the extent of political rights
because these partly reflect the quality of political and legal institutions) but also for
the correlation between the residuals of two distinct equations in the system. Indeed,
the correlation between the residuals of the regressions of corruption and growth is
equal to −0.25 and significant at the 1% level: some omitted explanatory variables
are common to the three equations. Taking into account such a correlation through
3sls between the residuals of different equations yields more efficient estimators than
equation-by-equation 2sls or classical estimations of panel data. Finally, 3sls estima-
tion is also preferable to fixed effects insofar as it preserves transversal information
contained in the data and since our variables, in particular those of corruption, are
quite stable over time.
As mentioned above, the variables Techcor, Polbias and Patience suffer from sub-
stantial measurement error with respect to the actual technology of corruption, the
lack of political rights and the discount factor. Hence, for reinforcing the treatment of
endogeneity, we introduce external instrumental variables which are used in the first
stage of the procedure to provide the predicted values of endogenous variables, then
considered as their instrumented values. These excluded instruments are defined as
follows:
• antiq is an index of the depth of experience of state-level institutions, or state
antiquity. It was developed by Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002)8 and
we use it here as an instrument for political and legal infrastructure. This relies on
Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002)’s paper which documents the use of
the state antiquity index as an appropriate instrument for institutional quality,
and in particular for the index of social infrastructure developed by Hall and
Jones (1999).
8The index was developed from the answers for each country to the following three questions for
each period of 50 years: a) Is there a government above the tribal level? b) Is this government foreign
or locally based? c) How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this government?
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• legsoc, legfr and legbr are dummies equal to 1 if the country’s legal system
has a socialist, a French or a British origin respectively9. Using the legal origin
as an instrument for the rule of law follows La Porta et al. (1998): their works
highlight the greater capacity of British common law systems to protect property
rights.
• polbiaslag is the ten-year lagged index of political rights.
• poplag is the ten-year lagged index of the growth rate of the population.
We also tried to include the percentage of natural resources exports in GDP in the set
of instruments. This index is often used as an instrument for the level of corruption
since abundant natural resources create strong incentives to rent-seeking, and hence to
corruption (Leite and Weidmann 1999). These exports being given as a percentage of
GDP, we suspect this instrument of being too endogenous. Adding this variable does
not change the main results but worsens the instrument validity tests.
We perform two tests for evaluating the validity of using instrumented estimations.
The Sargan overidentification test and the Cragg-Donald (CD) F statistic (see Cragg
and Donald 1993, Stock and Yogo 2002 and Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002). These two
tests are presented at the bottom of Table 2. They both suggest that the instruments
are valid. We also report the first-stage regressions in Appendix B (see Table 7). They
suggest a few points. First, state antiquity reinforces a lack of democracy. At the
same time, states which became independent more recently tend to have weaker legal
systems – favoring corruption – and to be weaker democracies. When the state was
colonized for a long time, a deeper experience of state-level institutions may strengthen
mechanisms for circumventing the legal system as well as authoritarian regimes which
flout citizens’ political rights. But a longer experience of independent statehood and
autonomy helps to build a stronger political and legal system. As regards the origin of
the legal system, our results are in line with legal-origins theory comparing the effects
of common law and civil law (La Porta et al. 1998, Beck and Levine 2003). Indeed,
legal systems with a French or socialist origin provide significantly less efficient legal
regimes (in particular to protect property rights) than those of British origin.
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Table 2: Estimation of the restricted model of two simultaneous equations
Model 3
Explanatory Dependent variables
variables Corrup Growth
Techcor 1.21∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.08) (0.09)
Polbias 0.45∗∗ 0.10
(0.20) (0.12)
Techcor ∗ Polbias -0.14∗∗ -0.10∗
(0.07) (0.05)
Patience.10−1 -0.14∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Ldlock 0.13∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Tropic -0.30∗∗∗
(0.08)
lnY0 -0.30
∗∗∗
(0.08)
Pop.10−1 -1.94∗∗
(0.90)
Observations 304
legbr legsoc legfr
Instruments antiq poplag polbiaslag
T ropic Ldlock lnY0
Sargan Test 0.77 1.47
p− value (0.86) (0.48)
Cragg-Donald F stat. 1.32 2.66
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote coefficients significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
3.3 Results
The results of our main estimation (Model 3) are presented in Table 2. As mentioned
above, two tests were run to check that the instruments we used were valid. The
coefficients associated with the explanatory variables indicate their marginal effects
on the dependent variables. However, because we use an interaction term, Techcor ∗
Polbias, the partial effects of Techcor and Polbias have to be calculated. The marginal
effect of Polbias on the level of corruption is given by β3+β4Techcor for each country i.
Figure 2 represents such an effect according to the quality of the legal system. Similarly,
the marginal effects of Techcor and Polbias on GDP growth are equal to γ2+γ4Polbias
and γ3 + γ4Techcor respectively. These effects are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
9These indicators are available on New York University Development Research Institute’s web site.
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Figure 1: Partial Effect of ν on the level of corruption
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Figure 2: Partial Effect of θ on the level of corruption
As expected, the technology of corruption (ν) appears to have a positive impact on
the level of corruption and its coefficient is significant at the 1% level. When the
judiciary does not manage to implement the law, corruption is made easier and less
condemned, and its level raises. A failing legal system reinforces corruption but this
effect gets lower as political power is increasingly concentrated (see Figure 1). In the
same way, the lack of political rights (θ) is linked to higher levels of corruption as
well, but it enhances the level of corruption significantly only in countries where the
technology of corruption is poor, as shown in Figure 2. In weak or non-democracies,
political power is unevenly distributed, and it is likely that rent-seekers have more
political weight, which makes the rent-seeking activity more attractive. Then the level
of corruption depends on the quality of both the legal and political systems. But
it seems that both determinants are substitutes rather than complements: a good
technology of corruption, proxied by a weak rule of law, facilitates corruption all the
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more in a context of large political rights. This result suggests that the indicator used
to approximate the level of corruption might measure not only effective corruption but
also potential corruption. Counterfactuals highlight that if Burundi’s technology of
corruption in 2000 had been equal to that of the USA, its level of corruption would
decrease from 3.77 to 2.76. Similarly, if Zimbabwe experimented the same technology
of corruption as Denmark in 2004 (0.59 instead of 3.04, that is divided by 5), the
level of corruption in Zimbabwe would drop from 3.24 to 1.56 (divided by 2). As a
comparison, the level of corruption in Denmark in 2004 was equal to 0.12.
0,5
Corruption
Technology
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Coefficient
Confidence
Interval
Figure 3: Partial Effect of ν on GDP Growth
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Figure 4: Partial Effect of θ on GDP Growth
In the regression of growth, Techcor, standing for ν, has a negative and significant
coefficient: whatever the extent of political rights in a country, the technology of cor-
ruption slows growth down. But the more concentrated political power, the more the
absence of rule of law (easy access to corruption) blocks growth (see Figure 3). Coun-
tries in this situation stand in the interior regime described above (with high values of
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ν and θ). On the opposite, small values of θ correspond to the regime with distortion
but no corruption: a good predatory technology means a high potential corruption
which leads voters to reduce public investment in order to deter corruption. This is
also harmful to growth but less than an increase in public investment aiming at “feed-
ing rent-seekers”, which occurs in the interior regime. Similarly, as Figure 4 shows, the
lack of political rights damages growth more as the legal system is less developed. At
one extreme, in countries where the predatory technology is weak, there is neither po-
tential nor effective corruption. Hence, even if political power is strongly concentrated,
public investment is not distorted and the extent of political rights has no incidence
on growth, as in the benchmark regime (left panel of Figure 4). At the opposite ex-
treme, if the predatory technology is well developed, corruption is potentially high.
When rent-seekers concentrate political power in their hands, corruption is effective
and public investment is increased, which weakens growth, as in the interior regime
(right panel of Figure 4). Simulating GDP per capita growth in Burundi, Ethiopia
and Zimbabwe with the values of USA, Norway and Denmark respectively have higher
effects if the value being simulated is ν rather than θ. If Burundi’s extent of political
rights were equal to those in USA, then Burundi’s growth rate in 2000 would increase
from 0.68% to 2.15 compared to 3.86% if it had the same technology of corruption.
If the technology of corruption in Zimbabwe were as weak as in Denmark, its growth
rate would rise from 1.05% to 2.72%, compared to only 1.87% if its political power was
similarly distributed. Hence, an interesting result of our estimation is that improving
the quality of the judicial system reduces corruption and favors growth more than ex-
tending political rights. This is perfectly in line with the result of Rigobon and Rodrik
(2005) according to which democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic
performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes.
The coefficient of the initial level of GDP per capita is significant at the 1% level. The
growth rate decreases when initial GDP per capita is higher. Then, all other things
being equal, the population growth rate has a negative and significant impact on the
level of corruption. As for patience, approximated by the number of years the party of
the chief executive has been in office, it appears to have a positive and significant impact
on the growth rate but a negative one on the level of corruption: the more impatient
the government, the more extensive the level of public corruption and embezzlement
and the weaker the growth rate. The two dummies controlling for geographic conditions
have significant coefficients in the regression of growth rate. As expected, hard climatic
conditions and being landlocked threaten growth.
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4 Robustness Estimations
In this section, we provide robustness estimations so as to check that the results and
mechanisms presented in the previous section are still valid with another set of instru-
ments and with other specifications of the model. Results are reported in Table 3.
We first modify the panel of instruments by introducing the logarithm of the number
of years of independence of the state: yrind. It measures the autonomy of the political
and legal system and its capacity to influence or resist foreign influence. Results of the
estimation based on this set of instruments are presented in model 3.1. The significance
and signs of explanatory variables are not altered. The global marginal effects of
Techcor and Polbias on the level of corruption and on the growth rate are very similar
to those obtained through our main estimation (model 3).
Then, in model 4, yearly dummies are added to the list of regressors to capture specific
effects due to time variations. 1996 is the excluded yearly dummy variable. The yearly
dummies are significant only in the regression of corruption. Their negative signs reveal
that the level of corruption was substantially overestimated in 1996, the hypothesis of
a sudden fall in the level of corruption all over the world after 1996 being doubtful.
However, taking into account such a gap in the index of corruption does not have any
incidence on the main results commented above. Finally, model 4.1 combines the new
specification including year dummies and the new set of instruments including yrind:
results are not altered by such changes either.
Finally, in order to check that standard errors of the estimated coefficients were not
artificially reduced by a large number of similar data points (corruption data are rel-
atively persistent over time), we estimated the same system for every year separately.
In a majority of cases, the effects of ν and θ on corruption and income growth remain
significant, at least at the 10%-level.
5 Conclusion
Most of the theory of corruption focuses on incentives, information and enforcement de-
termining corrupt practices, mainly due to market failures in a static context (Shleifer
and Vishny 1993, Banerjee 1997, and Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). The main contri-
bution of our model is to bridge the gap between this mostly static theory of corruption
and the standard theory of growth. In particular, we show how rent-seekers’ political
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Table 3: Robustness estimations
Model 3.1 4 4.1
Explanatory Dependent variables
variables Corrup Growth Corrup Growth Corrup Growth
Techcor 1.22∗∗∗ -0.01 1.22∗∗∗ -0.04 1.22∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Polbias 0.46∗∗ 0.11 0.46∗∗ 0.09 0.47∗∗ 0.10
(0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12)
Techcor ∗ Polbias -0.14∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.09∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Patience.10−1 -0.14∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ldlock 0.13∗ -0.15∗∗ 0.14∗∗ -0.16∗∗ 0.14∗∗ -0.15∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Tropic -0.31∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
lnY0 -0.29
∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pop.10−1 -1.98∗∗ -1.90∗∗ -1.95∗∗
(0.89) (0.89) (0.88)
Y ear 1998 -0.14∗∗ 0.01 -0.14∗∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Y ear 2000 -0.16∗∗ 0.05 -0.16∗∗ 0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Y ear 2002 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Y ear 2004 -0.22∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.22∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 304 304 304
yrind legbr legsoc legfr legbr legsoc legfr yrind legbr legsoc legfr
Instruments antiq poplag polbiaslag antiq poplag polbiaslag antiq poplag polbiaslag
T ropic Ldlock lnY0 Tropic Ldlock lnY0 Tropic Ldlock lnY0
Sargan Test 0.84 1.73 0.76 1.57 0.82 1.82
p− value (0.93) (0.63) (0.86) (0.46) (0.94) (0.61)
CD F stat. 1.20 2.28 1.29 2.65 1.18 2.28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote coefficients significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
”CD” stands for ”Cragg-Donald”.
power and corruption technology affect the level of corruption at equilibrium as well as
classical relationships such as the Modified Golden Rule. In addition to developing a
dynamic general equilibrium model of corruption and growth, we distinguish two dif-
ferent aspects of corruption: the level of corruption, which is determined endogenously
at equilibrium; and the predatory technology (an exogenous variable in the theory but
instrumented in the econometrics) which indicates the ease with which resources can
be captured.
One key prediction of the model is that, at the same equilibrium, several regimes may
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prevail according to the values of the institutional parameters. Each regime associates
levels of corruption and income growth to a combination of institutional parameters.
We examine empirically to what extent these regimes apply to different countries. We
also provide evidence that improving the quality of the legal and judicial system is
more efficient to fight against corruption and its detrimental effect on growth than
redistributing political power.
We estimate that both the poor quality of the legal system and the lack of political
rights favor corruption. Then, we show that the detrimental effect easy access to
corruption has on the growth rate is higher in countries where political power is strongly
concentrated. Finally, we have quantified the effect of higher predatory technology and
political weight of rent-seekers (approximated by the lack of political rights) on the
level of corruption and GDP per capita. These effects are large. If Zimbabwe had
Denmark’s rule of law and democracy levels, its annual income growth would double
and the level of corruption would decrease from 3.2 to 0.2, inferior to the Norwegian
level.
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A Solution to the Voting Problem
We follow McKenzie (1986) and de la Croix and Michel (2002) and use the Lagrangian
of period t Lt, which has the interest of being simpler and more intuitive (and yielding
the same results as the infinite Lagrangian). The Lagrangian Lt is composed of the
terms of the infinite Lagrangian which depends on kt, it and xt. Replacing Ut by its
value from (2) and Vt = u[νit − it], we obtain:
Lt = (1− xt)u[Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− it] + (1 + θ)xtu[νit − it]
+ ρµt+1 [(1− δ)kt + (1− νxt)it]− µt(1 + n)kt + φt (Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− νit) + ωtxt (12)
It is equal to the instantaneous utility plus the increase in the value of the capital stock,
ρµt+1kt+1 − µt(1 + n)kt minus the cost of the inequality constraints. For an optimal
solution, the derivatives of Lt with respect to the five variables are zero:
∂Lt
∂kt
= ((1− xt)u′[yt] + φt) Γ[1− xt]f ′K [kt]
+ρ(1− δ)µt+1 − (1 + n)µt = 0 (13)
∂Lt
∂it
= −(1− xt)u′[yt] + (1 + θ)(ν − 1)xtu′[νit − it] + ρµt+1(1− νxt)
−φtν = 0 (14)
∂Lt
∂xt
= −u[yt] + (1 + θ)u[νit − it]− νρµt+1it
− ((1− xt)u′[yt] + φt) Γ′[1− xt]f [kt] + ωt = 0 (15)
with
yt = Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− it.
The multipliers of the inequality constraints should satisfy:
φt ≥ 0
φt (Γ[1− xt]f [kt]− νit) = 0
νit ≤ Γ[1− xt]f [kt]
ωt ≥ 0
ωtxt = 0
−xt ≤ 0
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The transversality condition is:
lim
t→∞
ρtµtkt = 0. (16)
At each date, four possible cases are a priori possible, depending on which constraint
is binding. Among those, only three are logically possible. Let us consider these cases
in turn, which we label by the sign of the vector (φt, ωt).
1. (0,+) This is the regime where Equation (3) holds, so that the incentive con-
straint is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment is not dis-
torted;
2. (+,+) This case corresponds to a situation without corruption, but where Equa-
tion (3) does not hold. The incentive constraint holds with equality at xt = 0;
3. (+, 0) This is the interior regime with 0 < xt;
4. (0, 0) This case is not possible because ωt = 0 → xt > 0 which implies that the
incentive constraint should be binding, and thus φt > 0.
Benchmark Regime
We first consider the regime where xt = 0, φt = 0, and ωt > 0. Equation (3) holds and
the incentive constraint is not binding. There is no corruption and public investment
is not distorted. The first order conditions become
∂Lt
∂kt
= u′[yt]Γ[1]f
′
K [kt] + ρ(1− δ)µt+1 − (1 + n)µt = 0
∂Lt
∂it
= −u′[yt] + ρµt+1 = 0
∂Lt
∂xt
= −u[yt] + (1 + θ)u[νit − it]− νρµt+1it − u′[yt]Γ′[1]f [kt] + ωt = 0
The Keynes-Ramsey rule can be derived by replacing µt and µt+1 in the first equation
by their value computed from the second equation.
µt+1 = u
′[yt]/ρ →
u′[yt−1]
u′[yt]
=
ρ (Γ[1]f ′K [kt] + 1− δ)
1 + n
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The last equation can be used to derive an expression for the multiplier ωt:
ωt = u[yt]− (1 + θ)u[νit − it] + νρµt+1it + u′[yt]Γ′[1]f [kt]
Imposing ωt > 0 on it gives an upper bound on the parameter θ:
1 + θ <
u[yt] + νρµt+1it + u
′[yt]Γ
′[1]f [kt]
u[νit − it] ,
which, after substituting the value of µt+1 given by µt+1 = u
′[yt]/ρ leads to equation (8)
of the main text.
Distortion without Corruption
This is regime where xt = 0, φt > 0, and ωt > 0. This case corresponds to a situation
without corruption, but where Equation (3) does not hold. When the incentive con-
straint holds with equality, −u[yt] + (1 + θ)u[νit − it] simplifies into θu[yt]. The first
order conditions are:
∂Lt
∂kt
= (u′[yt] + φt) Γ[1]f
′
K [kt] + ρ(1− δ)µt+1 − (1 + n)µt = 0
∂Lt
∂it
= −u′[yt] + ρµt+1 − φtν = 0
∂Lt
∂xt
= θu[yt]− νρµt+1it − (u′[yt] + φt) Γ′[1]f [kt] + ωt = 0
A modified Keynes-Ramsey rule can be derived by replacing µt and µt+1 in the first
equation by their value computed from the second equation.
µt+1 =
u′[yt] + νφt
ρ
→
u′[yt−1]
u′[yt]
=
ρ (Γ[1]f ′K [kt] + 1− δ)
1 + n
+
ρ (Γ[1]f ′K [kt] + 1− δ)
1 + n
φt
u′[yt]
− ν φt−1
u′[yt]
.
Interior Regime: 0 > xt > 1 and φt 6= 0
This is the interior regime with 0 < xt < 1/ν. The multiplier φt > 0, but ωt = 0. When
the incentive constraint holds with equality, −(1−xt)u′[yt]+ (1+ θ)(ν−1)xtu′[νit− it]
simplifies into (νxt(1 + θ) − (1 + θxt))u′[yt], and u′[yt] = u′[νit − it]. The first order
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conditions are:
∂Lt
∂kt
= ((1− xt)u′[yt] + φt) Γ[1− xt]f ′K [kt]
+ρ(1− δ)µt+1 − (1 + n)µt = 0
∂Lt
∂it
= νxt(1 + θ)− (1 + θxt))u′[yt] + ρµt+1(1− νxt)− φtν = 0
∂Lt
∂xt
= θu[yt]− νρµt+1it − ((1− xt)u′[yt] + φt) Γ′[1− xt]f [kt] = 0
The shadow price of corruption can be computed by solving the fifth equation for φt:
φt =
θu[yt]− νρµt+1it − (1− xt)u′[yt]Γ′[1− xt]f [kt]
Γ′[1− xt]f [kt]
The Keynes-Ramsey rule can be derived by replacing µt and µt+1 in the first equation
by their value computed from the second equation.
µt+1 =
(1 + θxt)u
′[yt]− (1 + θ)νxt + νφt
ρ(1− νxt) →
u′[yt−1]
u′[yt]
=
ρ(1− νxt−1)
(1 + n)(1 + θxt−1)
(
(1− xt)Γ[1− xt]f ′K [kt] + (1− δ)
(1 + θxt)
(1− νxt)
)
+
ρ(1− νxt−1)
(1 + n)(1 + θxt−1)
φt
u′[yt]
Γ[1− xt]f ′K [kt]
+ (1− δ)νφt − (1 + θ)νxt
(1− νxt)u′[yt]
ρ(1− νxt−1)
(1 + n)(1 + θxt−1)
− νφt−1 − (1 + θ)νxt−1
(1 + θxt−1)u′[yt]
We directly look at this equation at steady state:
1− δ + (1− νx)
(1 + θx)
(
1− x+ φ
u′[y]
)
Γ[1− x]f ′K [k] =
1 + n
ρ
(
1− νφ+ (1 + θ)νx
(1 + θx)u′[y]
)
− (1− δ)νφ− (1 + θ)x
u′[y]
1
(1 + θx)
.
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B Data
Table 3: List of the countries being studied
Argentina China Greece Malaysia Spain
Australia Colombia Iceland Mauritius Sri Lanka
Austria Costa Rica India Mexico Sweden
Bangladesh Cyprus Indonesia Nepal Syria
Belgium Denmark Iran Netherlands Thailand
Bolivia Dominican Rep. Ireland New Zealand Tunisia
Botswana Egypt Israel Norway Turkey
Brazil El Salvador Jamaica Pakistan Uganda
Burundi Ethiopia Kenya Panama United Kingdom
Cameroon Fiji Korea, Rep. Papua New Guinea United States
Canada Finland Lesotho Peru Uruguay
Chile Germany Madagascar Philippines Venezuela
Singapore Zambia
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in The Estimations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Corrup 304 2.06 1.15 -0.07 3.77
Variables Growth 304 0.21 0.20 -0.46 0.87
Explanatory Techcor 304 2.08 1.04 0.26 4.00
Variables Polbias 304 1.71 1.92 0 6
Patience 304 10.32 12.62 1 71
Pop 304 1.39 0.79 -0.03 4.00
Tropic 304 0.45 0.50 0 1
Ldlock 304 0.13 0.33 0 1
lnY0 304 8.63 1.09 6.21 10.31
Instruments antiq 304 0.46 0.26 0.07 1
yrind 304 4.63 0.89 3.30 7.71
legsoc 304 0.02 0.13 0 1
legfr 304 0.47 0.50 0 1
legbr 304 0.38 0.49 0 1
polbiaslag 304 1.94 1.94 0 6
poplag 304 1.68 0.98 -0.46 4.09
natres 266 1387.69 1196.11 108.32 8020.70
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Figure 5: Countries’ Legal and Political Institutions
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Table 5: Yearly Statistics of the Two Dependent Variables
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corrup 1996 58 2.09 1.09 0.26 3.60
1998 62 2.00 1.21 -0.07 3.61
2000 62 2.01 1.18 -0.06 3.77
2002 62 2.10 1.14 0.05 3.65
2004 60 2.08 1.17 -0.03 3.66
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth 1996 58 0.19 0.23 -0.46 0.83
1998 62 0.20 0.21 -0.36 0.79
2000 62 0.22 0.20 -0.39 0.87
2002 62 0.20 0.20 -0.35 0.81
2004 60 0.21 0.17 -0.20 0.76
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Table 6: From the unrestricted to the restricted model
Model 1 2 3
Explanatory Dependent variables
variables Corrup Growth Corrup Growth Corrup Growth
Techcor 1.23∗∗∗ 0.01 1.23∗∗∗ -0.04 1.21∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Polbias 0.41∗∗ 0.26 0.44∗∗ 0.09 0.45∗∗ 0.10
(0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12)
Techcor ∗ Polbias -0.13∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.09∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.10∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Patience.10−1 -0.12 0.19∗∗∗ -0.13∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ldlock 0.13 -0.12∗ 0.13∗ -0.16∗∗ 0.13∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Tropic -0.04 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.29∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
lnY0 0.01 -0.29
∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pop.10−1 -1.58 -1.04 -1.78∗ -1.94∗∗
(0.98) (0.80) (0.94) (0.90)
Observations 304 304 304
Exp. Var. Ldlock Pop.10−1 Tropical
P (coeff. = 0) 0.90 0.20 0.73
legbr legsoc legfr
Instruments antiq poplag polbiaslag
T ropic Ldlock lnY0
Sargan Test 0.61 0.05 0.63 1.47 0.77 1.47
p− value (0.44) (0.82) (0.73) (0.48) (0.86) (0.48)
Cragg-Donald F stat. 1.70 1.70 1.48 2.66 1.32 2.66
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote coefficients which differ
significantly from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 7: Relevance Test
Do the Instruments Predict the Endogenous Regressors Well?
Techcor Polbias T echcor ∗ Polbias Patience.10−1 Pop
antiq 0.21 1.52∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.01
(1.63) (4.93) (2.94) (3.35) (-0.05)
yrind -0.15∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.06∗
(-3.97) (-4.37) (-3.41) (-2.88) (-1.75)
legfr 0.64∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.42∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(6.28) (2.85) (1.82) (2.21) (2.33)
legbr 0.13 0.41∗ 0.01 0.40∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(1.27) (1.78) (0.99) (1.75) (2.91)
legsoc.10 0.09∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ -0.02
(3.32) (5.72) (4.44) (7.98) (-0.84)
poplag 0.03 0.56∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.87) (6.22) (4.22) (2.52) (11.83)
polbiaslag -0.04∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ -0.01
(-1.82) (9.58) (7.37) (5.50) (-0.53)
Ldlock -0.22∗∗ -0.11 -0.17 0.47∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(-2.50) (-0.53) (-0.67) (2.34) (-2.67)
Tropic 0.32∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.57 0.86∗∗∗ 0.09
(4.63) (-0.04) (-1.08) (5.48) (1.36)
lnY0 -0.72
∗∗∗ -0.12 -1.33∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(-16.52) (-1.18) (-4.04) (7.62) (-4.62)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote coefficients which differ
significantly from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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